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The Spread of Anti-Trafficking Policies: 
Evidence from a New Index
* 
 
We analyze the spread of policies dealing with international trafficking in human beings. 
Arguing that countries are unlikely to make independent choices, we identify pressure, 
externalities and learning or emulation as plausible diffusion mechanisms for spatial 
dependence in anti-trafficking policies. We develop a new index measuring governments’ 
overall anti-trafficking policies for 177 countries over the 2000-2009 period. We also assess a 
country’s level of compliance in the three main constituent dimensions of anti-trafficking 
policies – prosecution, protection and prevention. Employing a spatial autoregressive model, 
we find that, with the exception of victim protection measures, anti-trafficking policies diffuse 
across contiguous countries and main trading partners due to externality effects. We find 
evidence for learning or emulation effects in all policy domains, with countries looking toward 
peers with similar political views or cultural values. Surprisingly, major destination countries 






According to the U.S. Department of State, there are more than 12 million victims of human 
trafficking worldwide. We investigate the spread of governments’ anti-trafficking policies 
around the world, using a new index. Our results suggest that anti-trafficking policies mainly 
diffuse across contiguous countries and main trading partners due to externality effects and 
via political and cultural similarities due to learning and emulation. 
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In the last few decades, human trafficking has become a growing phenomenon worldwide. 
The illicit trade in human beings across borders violates the human rights of victims, threatens 
national security and deteriorates the health of the affected economies and societies by 
increasing the size of the shadow economy and organized criminal activities (Belser 2005). 
Although the exact magnitudes and dimensions of the problem are unknown, available 
statistics suggest that human trafficking is one of the most serious transnational crimes in the 
21
st century. According to the U.S. Department of State (2010), there are more than 12 million 
victims of human trafficking worldwide. Interpol (2009) estimates that human trafficking is a 
multi-billion-dollar business, amounting to the third largest transnational crime following 
drug and arms trafficking. 
  Human trafficking can be seen as one of the dark sides of globalization. As 
advancements in technology and transportation connect countries more closely regardless of 
geographical distances, illicit flows of human beings have also become a global phenomenon. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that traffickers recruit victims worldwide and transfer them from 
one country to another, often across continents (U.S. Department of State 2010). For instance, 
according to the UNODC (2006), trafficking victims found in the United States came from 66 
countries in different regions (China, Mexico and Nigeria for example). Germany, another 
major destination, receives trafficking victims from at least 51 countries, including many from 
outside Europe (Afghanistan, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, etc.).  
  Given the growing significance of international human trafficking, it is no surprise that 
the international community has adopted several measures in the past ten years, including the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (2000, 
hereinafter the “Convention” or “Protocol”). Accordingly, social scientists have started to turn 
their attention towards policies enacted to combat human trafficking (Akee et al. 2010; Auriol 
and Mesnard 2010; Avdeyeva 2010; Bartilow 2010; Cho and Vadlamannati 2011; Di 
Tommaso et al. 2009; Friebel and Guriev 2006; Mahmouda and Trebesch 2009; Simmons and 
Lloyd 2010). One of the problems scholars face is the lack of reliable data on countries’ anti-
trafficking policies which can be compared over time and between countries. The U.S. 
Department of State reports a ranking of countries with respect to their actions in fighting 
human trafficking. They use a scale of 1-3,
1 which is based on the level of compliance with 
 
1 The tier-ranking consists of tier 1, 2, 2-watchlist and 3. “Tier 2” and “tier 2-watchlist” reflect the same level of 
compliance (with ‘watchlist’ providing information about a country’s development relative to the previous year). 3 
 
                                                           
the United States 2000 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA). However, 
the tier ranking has several drawbacks, which limit its reliability and relevance.
2 In particular, 
while the tier ranking provides an aggregate score of compliance with anti-trafficking policies, 
it fails to recognize the different levels of compliance in the three main policy dimensions – 
prosecution, protection and prevention. Separating the three dimensions is important. Theory 
and evidence indicate that better protection policy may encourage potential victims to risk 
illegal migration, which could lead them to fall prey to traffickers. Human trafficking inflows 
might therefore increase as a consequence, contradicting the objectives of prosecution and 
prevention policies (Akee et al. 2010). Countries can thus have the same overall ranking on 
the index, but for very different reasons.
3 
  We make two important contributions to the growing literature on human trafficking. 
First, we develop novel and original indices of anti-trafficking policies around the world, 
providing better, more detailed and disaggregated measures of the three prime policy 
dimensions enacted by countries. Specifically, we use raw data from two reports on human 
trafficking – the Annual Reports of Trafficking in Persons (United States State Department, 
2001-2010) and the Reports on Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns (United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006 and 2009) – to construct separate indices on the three policy 
dimensions (prosecution, protection and prevention), as well as one overall aggregate anti-
trafficking policy index for up to 177 countries over the 2000-2009 period. The index 
provides a score from 1 to 5 for the level of compliance, with each dimension of anti-
trafficking policies for each country and year. Second, we argue that policy choices across 
countries are very unlikely to be independent from each other. Major destination countries 
will wish to push for policy changes in relevant transit and origin countries. More generally, 
international human trafficking creates significant cross-country externalities and countries 
will also want to learn from or emulate the policies enacted by other countries. Because of 
these cross-country spillover effects, we argue that countries spatially depend on each other in 
 
2 The decision rule of the tier-ranking is not transparent to the public. It is not clear how the three levels of the 
ranking – full compliance, significant efforts and no significant efforts – are assessed and determined, making 
the ranking vulnerable to subjectivity (GAO 2006). It has been argued the tier-ranking is largely a tool of the U.S. 
government to influence other country’s policies through ‘naming’ and ‘shaming’ (Simmons and Lloyd 2010). It 
is determined based on evaluation of compliance with the United States’ domestic anti-trafficking law – the 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA 2000) – rather than international law. Its relevance 
for evaluating international standards is therefore limited.  
3 A number of countries in full compliance with the tier-ranking fail to ensure the basic legal rights of victims, 
punishing and deporting them, while demonstrating sound policy interventions in the other dimensions 
(prosecution and prevention). For instance, in the tier 1 group, victims in France and the United Kingdom were 
reportedly imprisoned and deported due to their actions related to the situations in which they were trafficked in 
2008 and 2009 (U.S. Department of State, 2009 and 2010).  4 
 
                                                           
their respective policy choices. We empirically investigate this hypothesis with a spatial 
autoregressive estimation model. 
  To foreshadow our results, we find evidence for spatial dependence in anti-trafficking 
policies. In particular, policies diffuse via externality effects across contiguous countries and 
main trading partners – with the exception of protection policies, for which one would not 
expect any externality effect. Policies also diffuse via learning or emulation effects as 
countries look for cues (or information) from other countries sharing political and cultural 
similarities. However, we do not find any significant effect of pressure from the United States 
via aid. Nor do we find evidence that major destination countries pressurize relevant major 
transit and origin countries to enact stricter anti-trafficking policies.  
  We proceed as follows. In section 2, we develop theoretical arguments as to why anti-
trafficking policies are not independently chosen by countries. In section 3, we introduce our 
indices on anti-trafficking policies. The method of estimation and data are described in 
section 4, while we discuss our results in section 5. Section 6 tests for the robustness of our 
results. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Spatial Dependence in Anti-trafficking Policies 
Spatial dependence in policy choices has become a key concept in the recent literature 
analyzing policy diffusion across countries (Neumayer and Plümper 2010; Gassebner et al. 
2011; Gauri 2011; de Soysa and Vadlamannati 2010; Greenhill et al. 2009; Eichengreen and 
Leblang 2008; Pitlik 2007; Blonigen et al. 2007). Spatial dependence exists whenever the 
marginal utility of one unit of observation (here: a country) is affected by the decision-making 
of other units of observation (Neumayer and Plümper 2010). For example, if policies enacted 
in one country are influenced by policy choices in other countries, then they are said to 
spatially depend on each other. From a theoretical perspective, spatial dependence can result 
from pressure, externalities, learning and emulation (Elkins and Simmons 2005; Simmons and 
Elkins, 2004).
4 The major destination countries of internationally trafficked persons are likely 
to exert pressure onto countries which function as major sources of transit and/or origin for 
people trafficked into these major destinations. Major destination countries will be averse to 
illegal migration into their territories (as international trafficking always is) and will resent the 
increase in other transnational criminal activities (such as drug and arms trafficking) that 
typically accompany human trafficking (Bartilow 2010). Moreover, human trafficking creates 
 
4 They list coercion, rather than pressure, and add competition. However, coercion is incompatible with policy 
choice and competition can be subsumed under externalities. On the other hand, emulation could be subsumed 
under learning unless countries blindly follow others in their policy choices.  5 
 
a shadow economy of illegal labor markets and businesses with estimated annual profits of 
some one billion dollars in industrialized countries (Belser 2005) – money which is not taxed 
and is likely to be used for illegal activities. Yet, the effectiveness of policies undertaken in 
destination countries will be undermined if other countries, particularly relevant transit and 
origin countries, do not follow suit. The strictest anti-trafficking policies in destination 
countries may be ineffective if countries of origin and transit have lax policies in place. Hence, 
successful anti-trafficking policies in destination countries depend on a ratcheting up of 
policies in origin and transit countries, as well as major destination countries exerting pressure 
on laggards. 
  In addition to pressure, externalities are rampant in this policy area (Simmons and 
Llyod 2010). Anti-trafficking policies enacted by one country create significant externalities 
that other countries cannot simply ignore. Stricter policies in one destination country will 
deflect some of the flows of trafficked persons into other destination countries, while stricter 
policies in one origin or transit country will prompt transnational trafficking networks to 
increasingly resort to other origin or transit countries. Similar to international drug-trafficking, 
unless policies can address the underlying supply and demand factors driving international 
trafficking (which they typically cannot), stricter anti-trafficking policies in one country will 
merely deflect the problem onto other countries with weaker policies in place, such that there 
is an incentive to ratchet policies upwards over time. In other words, by predicting externality 
effects of such transnational crime, countries will be able to update their anti-trafficking 
measures, following relevant policy changes of other countries which share certain 
characteristics, such as geographic proximity and economic similarity.  
  Lastly, anti-trafficking policies are being set in a relatively new arena of public 
policies, with some countries, such as the United States and a few countries in Western 
Europe, running ahead of others. Laggards will be uncertain in regards to which policies to 
choose on their own, and will therefore look for cues (or information) in the policies of other 
countries. Importantly, countries will not simply wish to follow the top leaders in North 
America and Western Europe. These are all major destination countries and following their 
lead may not produce positive outcomes in other countries – mostly origin and transit 
countries of trafficking victims – because the root causes of the problem and the groups 
targeted differ from those of the leading countries as does their cultural and political setting. 
In dealing with uncertainty regarding policy design and its outcomes, the more competently 
governed lagging countries will want to actively learn from leaders in their reference groups – 
i.e., from culturally, politically, or geographically proximate countries who are also early 6 
 
                                                           
adopters of relevant policies (Elkins and Simmons 2005), while other laggards may simply 
wish to emulate or mimic policies from other reference countries without any major learning 
effect.  
  In sum, there are many reasons why one would expect spatial dependence in anti-
trafficking policies. Some countries will be pressured by others, some will experience 
externalities created by others, and some will want to learn from or emulate others. 
Importantly, the strength of these effects will differ across countries, depending on how and to 
whom they are connected. To test for these hypothesized spatial dependence effects, we 
estimate spatial autoregressive models in section 5, in which the spatially-weighted policy 
choices of other countries are allowed to affect the domestic policy choice of the country 
under observation, with the weights capturing the various types of connectivity among 
countries. Before discussing our empirical research design, we explain how we have coded 
novel measures of anti-trafficking policies. 
 
 3. Novel Measures of Anti-trafficking Policies 
In response to the emergence of human trafficking onto the international policy arena, several 
important international legal instruments have been introduced in the past ten years, including 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (2000) 
and the Council of Europe  Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 
(2008).
5 The adoption of the Convention and the Protocol is followed by rapid ratification by 
countries. After opening for signature in November 2000, the Convention has been ratified by 
158 parties and the Protocol by 142 to date. The Protocol in particular represents an important 
step forward, by providing an internationally recognized definition of human trafficking
6 for 
the first time, as well as introducing its three important policy dimensions: (i) prosecuting 
 
5 There are several earlier versions of international treaties for human trafficking, including the International 
Agreement for the Suppression of the "White Slave Traffic" (1904). Several other international treaties relevant 
to human trafficking exist today: The International Labor Organization Convention 182, the Elimination of 
Worst Forms of Child Labor (1999); the United Nations Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (2000); the International Labor 
Organization Convention 29, Forced Labor (1930); and the International Labor Organization Convention 105, 
Abolition of Forced Labor (1957).  
6 According to the Anti-trafficking Protocol, trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or 
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or service, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or 
the removal of organs (article 3-(a)). 7 
 
                                                           
(criminalizing) traffickers, (ii) protecting victims, and (iii) preventing the crime of human 
trafficking (UNODC 2006).  
  Our novel and original indices are coded to reflect policies in these three dimensions. 
We decompose each dimension into several important requirements prescribed by the 
Protocol and evaluate compliance for each of them. Compliance with these requirements is 
independently evaluated by at least two trained coders based on clearly instructed coding 
guidelines and decision rules.
7 The scores for each dimension are aggregated to a five-point 
scale ranging from 1 to 5, where the highest value indicates full compliance and the lowest 
value no compliance.
8 
  The raw data are derived from two reports on human trafficking, the Annual Report of 
Trafficking in Persons (United States State Department, 2001-2010) and the Report 
on Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006 
and 2009). The U.S. State Department reports provide detailed country narratives every year 
on the anti-trafficking efforts of up to 180 countries in the three dimensions of human 
trafficking listed above (an annual report covering the period one year before publication). 
The UN Office on Drugs and Crime reports include information about criminal justice and 
victim protection policies in approximately 155 countries for various years.
9 As the State 
Department’s reports provide systematic and comprehensive information covering a larger 
number of countries each year, we use these as our main source. We then check the validity of 
the information provided by employing the UN reports. 
  The sub-index on ‘prosecution policy’ measures the level of governments’ efforts to 
punish and prosecute traffickers and other related offenders (such as employers of trafficking 
victims, law enforcement officials who collude with traffickers, and clients of services 
provided by human trafficking victims). The prime requirements for governments to 
implement are broken down into six areas: (i) the adoption of anti-trafficking law, (ii) the 
adoption of child trafficking law, (iii) the application of other relevant laws, (iv) the 
stringency of penalties, (v) the level of law enforcement, and (vi) the collection of crime 
statistics. We select these requirements based on article 5 (criminalization) of the Protocol. 
Countries receive the highest possible score (five) if the country has a legislative measure 
specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons and the law is fully enforced. It receives a score 
of four if it has adopted legislative measures specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons but 
 
7  Appendix 1 presents a short version of the coding guidelines. The full version is available in our online 
appendix (www.human-trafficking-research.org). 
8 In the rare case of disagreement between the two coders, the principal investigators decided on the scores. 
9 The reports summarize information about the adoption and implementation of anti-trafficking policies from the 
1990s to the present, but do not provide systematic information on an annual basis.  8 
 
                                                           
the law is not fully enforced. A score of three is coded if the country does not have a 
legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons but applies some other 
relevant laws to punish offenders and this other law is at least adequately enforced. A score of 
two implies that the country does not have a legislative measure specifically prohibiting 
trafficking in persons, but it applies some other related law to punish offenders without, 
however, adequately enforcing this law. If the country has a legislative measure specifically 
prohibiting trafficking in persons but does not enforce the law at all it also receives a score of 
two. The lowest possible score of one is obtained if the country does not have a legislative 
measure prohibiting trafficking in persons, no other law is applied, and there is no evidence of 
punishment for such a crime at all. The short description of the coding guideline is reproduced 
in Appendix A and the detailed full version is available in our online appendix.
10 
  The second sub-index, ‘protection policy’, is coded analogously. It assesses the level 
of governmental efforts to protect and assist the victims of human trafficking. Nine prime 
requirements imposed by the Protocol (article 6, 7 and 8) are evaluated: (i) no punishment of 
victims, (ii) imposing no self-identification in order to prove their status as a victim; (iii) 
assistance for legal proceedings, (iv) the provision of residence permits, (v) basic services for 
housing, (vi) medical training, (vii) job training, (viii) assistance for rehabilitation and (vi) 
assistance for repatriation. Ensuring no punishment of victims receives special consideration 
in our evaluation
11 because this requirement represents a basic human right in anti-trafficking 
policy, recognizing ‘victims of exploitation’ (UNODC 2006; Cameron and Newman 2008: 
Chapter 1). The highest score of five is given to countries demonstrating very strong efforts in 
preventing trafficking in persons. Countries obtain a score of four (three) if they demonstrate 
strong (modest) efforts against trafficking in persons, and a score of two for limited efforts. A 
score of one is given if the country demonstrates no effort against trafficking in persons. 
Again, the coding guidelines are provided in Appendix A and the online appendix. 
  The third dimension of anti-trafficking policies, ‘prevention policy’, evaluates the 
level of governmental efforts to prevent and combat human trafficking. Based on the 
requirements of the Protocol provided in article 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, seven areas are 
evaluated. Examples are the implementation of campaigns for anti-trafficking awareness; 
training government and military officials (including peace keepers); facilitating information 
exchange among relevant authorities; monitoring borders, train stations, airports, etc.; 
adopting national action plans for combating trafficking in persons; promoting cooperation 
 
10 See www.human-trafficking-research.org. 
11 To obtain score 4 or 5, the requirement of no punishment of victims has to be satisfied.  9 
 
with NGOs and international organizations; and facilitating cooperation with other 
governments. Again, the index ranges between one and five, with higher values reflecting 
stricter policies, as detailed in Appendix A. 
  In addition to the three sub-indices, we also calculate an overall “3P” anti-trafficking 
policy index. This is computed as the unweighted sum of the three dimensions. The overall 
index thus ranges between 3 and 15. It is available for up to 175 countries over the 2000-2009 
period. Data availability and global and regional average scores are illustrated for selected 
years in Table 1. As can be seen, relevant information becomes available for more countries 
over time. As expected, the developed world performs better than the rest of the world. 
European and OECD countries demonstrate the highest commitments to anti-trafficking 
policies in all of the three dimensions, while efforts are minimal and even decreasing in South 
Asia and the Middle East in recent years.  
  Table 1 is based on all available information with changing country samples over time. 
In order to detect policy changes over time, we prefer to fix the sample to those countries that 
have data available over the entire period of time. This is done in figures 1-3, which illustrate 
how anti-trafficking policies in different groups of countries develop over time. This graphical 
illustration shows that the level of compliance in all of the three dimensions improved for the 
last ten years (see figure 1). In particular, compliance with prosecution policy was highest, on 
average, for all years and experienced the most significant improvement during the period: In 
the fixed sample, the worldwide average score of 2.90 in 2000 increased to 4.26 in 2009. 
Meanwhile, the average prevention policy score increased from 2.53 in 2000 to 3.67 in 2009. 
On the contrary, our index suggests that governmental efforts to protect victims of human 
trafficking remain weaker than their efforts to criminalize traffickers and prevent the crime of 
human trafficking. The worldwide average score of protection policy are lowest for all years, 
e.g., 2.26 in 2000 and 2.97 in 2009, and also shows the slowest improvement over time. This 
descriptive outcome of our index indicates that, in terms of compliance with anti-trafficking 
policy, countries take the ‘justice and prevention’ aspect of the crime more seriously than the 
human rights aspect, as pointed out by Simmons and Lloyd (2010).  
  Figure 2 shows the development of the 3P index across regions over time, while figure 
3 contains the same information for different income groups. As can be seen, with the 
exception of the Middle East/North Africa and South Asia, there are clear improvements in 
compliance with anti-trafficking policies over time. It is in these regions, together with Sub-
Saharan Africa, where the overall level of the anti-trafficking policy index is lowest in 2009. 
It is also remarkable that the 3P index showed high values in the Western Europe and other 10 
 
                                                           
industrialized countries group, while the remaining groups converged to this higher level over 
the 2000-2009 period. Splitting the sample up by income, the index levels are particularly 
high for OECD countries. High-income non-OECD countries show lower levels of 
compliance with anti-trafficking policies, comparable to those of low income countries, as 
well as lower and upper middle income countries. All country groups have improved their 
index values since 2000. 
  Table 2 shows that the three dimensions of the 3P anti-trafficking policy index are 
clearly not redundant. It reports the correlation coefficients across the sub-indices and the 
overall index, as well as the U.S. Department of State’s tier-ranking. Not surprisingly, the 
three dimensions are positively correlated with each other. However, the correlations among 
the sub-indices of the 3P index are modest, ranging between 0.52 and 0.64. This suggests that 
the sub-indices are individually relevant and the disaggregation into the three dimensions 
captures differences in compliance across countries with each of the 3Ps.
12 The table also 
shows the modest levels of correlation between each of the 3Ps and the tier-ranking. The 
correlation of 0.72 between the aggregate 3P index and the tier-ranking suggests that both 
measures capture the general direction of the development of anti-trafficking policies, but are 
to some extent different. We stress that compared to the tier-ranking, our index does not rely 
on a single informational source, but integrates all available information in order to minimize 
potential biases one informational source may have.  
 
4. Estimation Model, Method and Data 
Our baseline estimation model follows the specification in Bartilow (2010). His dependent 
variable is the level of compliance with the United States 2000 Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act (TVPA). The U.S. Department of State reports a ranking of countries 
with respect to their actions to fight human trafficking, on a scale of 1-3.
13 On the original 
scale, countries whose governments fully comply with the TVPA receive the lowest value 
(tier 1). Countries with governments not fully complying with the minimum standards 
required but exerting a significant effort to achieve full compliance, are ranked medium (tier 
2), while countries with governments that do not fully comply and do not exert significant 
efforts are ranked highest (tier 3).
14 We recode the ranking so that higher values are deemed 
 
12 The usual threshold for regarding sub-dimensions as relevant is a correlation of at most 0.7 (McGillivray and 
White 1993).  
13 Bartilow (2010) uses a fourth category relying on information on how a country’s policies evolve compared to 
the previous year (i.e., whether the country is on the “watchlist”). We do not follow this coding, as “tier 2” and 
“tier 2-watchlist” reflect the same level of compliance. 
14 See the Trafficking in Persons Report (2010), U.S. Department of State. “better.” We use this dependent variable only in a baseline regression for comparative reasons. 
Our main estimations are based on our newly constructed anti-trafficking policy variables. 
  Our regressions are based on pooled time-series cross-section (panel) data, covering 
the 2002-2009 period.
15 We use robust standard errors, clustered at the country level, to 
account for the fact that observations from the same country in different years are not 
independent observations. Since some of the data are not available for all countries or years, 
the panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of 
explanatory variables. Still following Bartilow, we include the temporal lag of the dependent 
variable, which turns out to be highly significant according to all specifications. Our preferred 
estimation equation takes the following form: 
 
   ,            ,         
′   ,       ∑                               , (1)    , 
where   ,  represents our measures of anti-trafficking policies in country   at year  ,   ,  is the 
vector of explanatory variables,    and    represent country and year fixed effects respectively, 
and   ,    represents the idiosyncratic error term. The spatial lag variable∑                
consists of the product of the ‘spatial y’ and a spatial weighting matrix       . The spatial y is 
the value of the dependent variable in other countries k, while the spatial weighting matrix 
measures the relative connectivity between country i and other countries k (Plümper and 
Neumayer 2010). We use different weights, as explained below, thus generating different 
spatial lag variables, which enter separately in the estimation models. The reason for not 
including them together in our preferred specifications is that the spatial lag variables are 
highly correlated with each other, thus creating multi-collinearity problems if jointly 
estimated.
16 Still, we also report results with all spatial lag variables included. We row-
standardize all weighting matrices, such that the spatial lag variables represent the weighted 
average of policies in other countries. This practice, which is typically, if erroneously, 
regarded as standard practice (Plümper and Neumayer 2010), is nevertheless justified here.  
Our theory predicts that countries will learn from their civilizational peers and main trading 
partners, independent of how many peers there are or how much they absolutely trade. With 




15 Data on compliance with human trafficking policies for the years 2000-01 are also available. However, given 
that values are missing for many countries in these years we exclude them from the analysis. 
16 In our estimation sample, the correlation of the spatial lags is around 0.5. Note that the significant coefficients 
might thus to some extent reflect the effects of other, omitted, lags. 12 
 
                                                           
lagged by one year since it is unlikely that countries could react to the policies of other 
countries immediately (i.e., in the same year). 
  The dependent variables are categorical and ordinal, for which in principle ordered 
probit or ordered logit would be the most appropriate estimators. However, the larger the 
number of categories, the less persuasive the case for using ordered probit or logit 
(Wooldridge 2002) and our aggregate 3P index has 15 categories. Moreover, Hausman tests 
strongly call for the inclusion of country fixed effects to avoid omitted variable bias from 
unobserved country heterogeneity (see equation (1)), which is facilitated by using a linear 
estimator like ordinary least squares (OLS) or the system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). We therefore use both ordered 
probit, OLS and system GMM. 
  In choosing our control variables, we follow Bartilow (2010) and include an index of 
control of corruption. This perceptions-based index is provided by Kaufmann et al. (2009) and 
ranges from -1.63 (high risk of corruption) to 2.58 (low risk of corruption), in the estimation 
sample of Table 3, column 1 below.
17 As Bartilow argues, enforcement of policies is likely to 
depend on the government and bureaucracy’s capacity to enforce these policies. With rising 
corruption, both bureaucrats and government officials are less likely to enforce sound policies. 
A lower degree of corruption is thus likely to improve policies against human trafficking. We 
include the Polity IV indicator of democracy, ranging between -10 and 10, with higher values 
representing a more democratic political regime (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). This is because 
democratic governments should be more likely to follow international law (Bjørnskov 2010, 
Dixon 1993, Hathaway 2007, Neumayer 2005, Slaughter 1995). In democratic countries, it is 
easier for citizens, non-governmental organizations and the media to monitor governmental 
compliance with an international treaty. Furthermore, as the democratic legalism literature 
suggests, democracies are more likely to comply with international legal obligations because 
of their respect for judicial processes and constitutional constraints carried over into the realm 
of international politics (Simmons 1998). According to Bartilow, gender representation is 
important for human trafficking policies. As he argues, women are more likely to pursue 
policies which protect their own rights.
18 We measure the level of women’s rights employing 
two indicators: The percentage of female parliamentarians in the national parliament (taken 
 
17 Bartilow uses Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. However, this index does not provide 
comparable time-series data and substantially reduces the number of observations if included, so we prefer to use 
the index provided by Kaufmann et al. (2009) here. 
18  This is in line with the broader literature. For example, according to Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2005), 
reservation of political mandates for women in India has led to policies benefiting especially women. Studying 
voting behavior of U.S. congressmen, Washington (2006) finds that congressmen with daughters are 
substantially more likely to vote in-line with feminist views. 13 
 
                                                           
from the World Bank Gender Statistics 2010) and the Cingranelli-Richards indicator of 
women’s economic rights.
19 We code an International Regime dummy variable, using data on 
whether or not a country has ratified the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (2000). Finally, we include a 
country’s (log) per capita GDP and the amount of U.S. aid inflows (as a percentage of GDP). 
While per capita GDP proxies for a country’s level of development, U.S. aid measures the 
potential pressure exerted by the U.S. to reform policies. Indeed, the U.S. State Department 
sometimes threatens to withhold aid in case of non-compliance with human trafficking 
policies (U.S. Department of State, Annual Report on Trafficking in Persons 2004).
20 In 
section 2, we identified pressure as one of the reasons for spatial dependence in anti-
trafficking policies. The inclusion of the U.S. aid measure is meant to capture any 
pressurizing effect that the U.S. might exert on aid-receiving developing countries, such that 
our spatial lag variables, to which we turn now, do not simply pick up the effect that U.S. 
pressure has on policies in the main recipient countries of its aid. 
  As argued in section 2, when choosing anti-trafficking policies, countries are very 
likely to spatially depend on the policy choices of other countries. Such spatial dependence is 
best analyzed in what is called a spatial autoregressive model, in which the weighted average 
of the dependent variable in other countries (the so-called spatial lag variable), enters the 
estimation equation as an explanatory variable. The weights used in the construction of the 
spatial lag variable represent the relative importance of foreign countries’ policy choices for 
domestic policy-making in the country of observation. Weights can be dichotomous, as is the 
case with the dummy variables for the location of countries in a certain region or the sharing 
of a common border between countries, or continuous, as is the case for the variables 
measuring the spatial proximity between countries or the importance of their trade 
relationship.  
  In section 2, we identified pressure, externalities, learning and emulation as reasons 
for spatial dependence in anti-trafficking policies, i.e., as causal mechanisms or channels 
 
19 Bartilow uses a narrower indicator on gender equality of marriage and divorce, while we prefer to use an 
indicator more broadly defined. Using the CIRI indicator of women’s social rights, we lose more than 400 
observations, so we prefer taking the economic rights indicator. Correlation between the two among our sample 
is 0.64. 
20 Bartilow (2010) uses the absolute amount of U.S. aid. We prefer to scale inflows by GDP in order to avoid 
capturing a mere scale effect. We also included the share of women among the ministers of a country’s 
government (taken from various issues of the UNDP Human Development Reports). Given that these data are 
only available for four years, we had to use linear interpolation before being able to include the variable in the 
regression. Note however, that the share of female ministers is not significant at conventional levels in any of the 
specifications shown in Table 3. Bartilow also uses some additional variables that did not turn out to be 
significant at conventional levels in his regressions. We do not include them here. 14 
 
                                                           
through which policies might diffuse. Unfortunately, it is not possible to choose weights that 
either perfectly or exclusively capture one of these diffusion channels. However, our weights 
were chosen with a view to account for these channels as much as possible. Specifically, as 
weighting variables we use information on the identity of the major transit and source 
countries for each destination country, contiguity (two countries share a land border or are 
separated by less than 150 miles of sea distance), bilateral trade, similarity in voting on those 
issues regarded as key by the United States in the United Nations General Assembly,
21 and a 
civilizational dummy. Transit and source countries are vulnerable to pressure from their major 
destination countries since the effectiveness of policies in the latter requires the ratcheting-up 
of policies in the former. Note that in the estimations containing this spatial lag variable, the 
sample is reduced to countries which function as major transit or origin countries as we 
assume that these countries experience pressure from destination countries. The relevant 
spatial lag variable is undefined for countries that do not fall into this category. Contiguity 
and bilateral trade predominantly capture externalities. A country contiguous to other 
countries k is likely to experience the strongest impact of any externality generated by policy 
choices in countries k. This is because contiguous countries tend to be close substitutes as 
either destination, transit or origin countries. The same is true for countries which trade a lot 
with each other, not least because flows of people often follow flows of goods and services. 
Of course, contiguity and bilateral trade do not exclusively capture externality effects, but will 
also partly cover learning and emulation effects if countries learn from or emulate those 
countries of geographical proximity or economic importance. To some extent, due to the 
correlation among the spatial lags they will in part also capture the impact of the omitted lags. 
Yet, we argue that similarity of voting and the civilizational belonging of countries 
predominantly capture learning and emulation effects. Countries wishing to learn from or 
emulate other countries will seek those with which they share common political views and/or 
values. The similarity of voting in the UN General Assembly, particularly on key issues, 
captures the similarity of political views well, while countries belonging to the same 
civilization, such as the Western, Islamic, African, Latin American, Sinic or Hindu groups, 
are likely to share common values. 
 
21 Not all votes in the General Assembly are likely to be of great importance. Focusing on a sub-set of votes 
might thus be superior. The U.S. State Department provides a classification of votes it considers important in 
yearly reports since 1983. Arguably, these votes are also likely to be the more important ones (on average) for 
countries other than the United States. The voting behavior of each country on every roll call vote in the UN 




  Appendix B shows the exact definitions of all variables with their sources, while 
Appendix C reports descriptive statistics.  
 
5. Results 
Column 1 of Table 3 replicates the analysis of Bartilow (2010) for our sample and definition 
of explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the 3-scale tier ranking provided by the 
U.S. Department of State. Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, estimation is 
carried out with ordered probit. We therefore omit the country fixed effects because including 
country dummies in ordered probit/logit models with a limited number of observations tends 
to produce inconsistent estimates – the so-called incidental parameter problem (for a summary 
see Lancaster 2000). We do however include a dummy for each year. 
  As can be seen in column 1, the quality of a country’s anti-trafficking policy improves 
with the perceived absence of corruption and a more democratic regime, at the one and five 
percent levels of statistical significance, respectively. At the ten percent level, better women’s 
rights on the CIRI indicator are correlated with stricter policies against human trafficking. The 
lagged dependent variable is also significant at the one percent level, with the expected 
positive coefficient. Contrary to the results in Bartilow, per capita GDP, U.S. aid, and 
international regime membership are not significant at conventional levels.
22 
  Column 2 replicates the analysis using our overall 3P index as the dependent variable 
instead. As can be seen, the results are largely unchanged. The exception is the control of 
corruption index, which turns out to be insignificant at conventional levels. 
  Given that our 3P index contains 15 categories, OLS seems suitable as well. Given 
that it also eases the quantitative interpretation of the coefficients, we report OLS results in 
columns 3 and 4. While column 3 excludes country fixed effects, column 4 includes them. 
Excluding fixed effects, the results are almost identical to the ordered probit specification. 
However, once we include them, the control of corruption index is significant at the five 
percent level, while the share of women in the legislature is no longer significant at 
conventional levels. Surprisingly, the coefficient of democracy reverses its sign, but is only 
significant at the ten percent level. 
  With the temporally lagged dependent variable and the country fixed effects 
simultaneously included in the estimations, our results could be biased and inconsistent in a 
short panel (Nickell 1981). We therefore proceed with the system GMM estimator as 
 
22 Note however that Bartilow uses instrumental variables to take account of the potential endogeneity of U.S. 
aid. Given that this variable is not central to our analysis, we do not follow Bartilow here, but acknowledge the 
likely endogeneity of the variable. 16 
 
developed in Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Results are based on 
the two-step estimator implemented by Roodman (2005) in Stata, including Windmeijer’s 
(2005) finite sample correction. The Hansen test on the validity of the instruments used 
(amounting to a test for the exogeneity of the covariates), and the Arellano-Bond test of 
second order autocorrelation (which must be absent from the data in order for the estimator to 
be consistent), do not reject the specification at conventional levels and thus support our 
choice of which variables to model as exogenous. 
  The results from column 5 are similar to those obtained previously with ordered probit 
and OLS (excluding country fixed effects). In columns 6 and 7 we replicate the results 
excluding the three variables that are never significant at conventional levels (international 
regime membership, per capita GDP and U.S. aid). The results are unchanged. 
  Quantitatively, we find that an increase in the democracy index by one point increases 
the 3P index by 0.07 points, while an increase in the women’s rights index by one point 
increases it by 0.24 points (focusing on the GMM results reported in column 7). An increase 
in corruption by 0.1 on the -1.6 to 2.6 scale, increases the 3P index by almost 0.04. 
  In Table 4 we turn to the estimation of our hypothesis of spatial dependence in anti-
trafficking policies, initially focusing on the aggregate 3P anti-trafficking policy index. The 
identification of a spatial dependence effect rests on the assumption that the estimation model 
controls for confounding factors that may be correlated with the spatial lag. This is a 
demanding requirement. If, for example, policies generally become more stringent over time, 
then spatial lag variables will tend to be statistically significant predictors, but unless the 
general upward trend in policies is truly caused by spatial dependence, the estimated 
coefficient is upward biased. Similarly, although countries may make similar policy choices 
because of shared values or cultures predominating in a region for example, this doesn’t 
necessarily mean that any true spatial dependence effect is at work via learning or emulation. 
Plümper and Neumayer (2010) argue that one must include the temporally lagged dependent 
variable and year-specific time fixed effects to account for common trends over time and 
common temporal shocks, while country fixed effects are needed to account for unobserved 
spatial heterogeneity and the spatial clustering of countries. Such stringent model 
specification minimizes, but cannot fully eliminate, the impact of potentially confounding 
factors. Fortunately, this model specification coincides with our preferred estimation equation 
(1). Spatial lag variables cannot be exogenous: If country i were to be affected by the policies 
of other countries, the policies of other countries will also be affected by the policies chosen 
by country i. Rather than applying spatial maximum likelihood techniques, which are 17 
 
                                                           
computationally difficult to implement, in Table 4 we exclusively use the system GMM 
estimator, additionally modeling the spatial lag variables as endogenous, similar to the 
temporally lagged dependent variable. Kukenova and Monteiro (2009) show that in Monte 
Carlo simulations, the system GMM estimator outperforms other estimators for spatial 
dynamic panel data models with one or more endogenous variables. For parsimony, we focus 
on the model specification from column (7) in Table 3. 
  As can be seen in Table 4, the effects of the control variables are not greatly affected 
by the inclusion of the spatial lags. Two of the spatial lags are significant at the five percent 
level at least, those being the contiguity and voting similarity-weighted ones. As argued above, 
this most likely captures an externality and a learning or emulation effect. Contiguous 
countries are exposed to the effect of stricter policies in neighboring countries,
23 while 
countries look for cues from other countries with similar political views in their own policy 
design. In contrast, we find no evidence of a pressure effect since origin and transit countries 
do not seem to follow the policies of the countries for which they are major countries of 
transit or origin. If other contiguous countries increased the strictness of their anti-trafficking 
policies by one point in the previous year, then the country under observation is estimated to 
tighten its own policy by 0.232 points. In other words, the (short-run) speed of policy 
diffusion is about one quarter. The speed of policy diffusion is stronger for the spatial 
dependence effect, which weighs the influence of other countries by the degree to which they 
vote similarly on key issues at the UN General Assembly. A one point tightening of policies 
in similar countries in the previous year raises domestic policy stringency by roughly half a 
point.
24 
  Column 6 includes the spatial lags jointly rather than separately. In order to minimize 
the number of instruments in the regressions, we collapse the matrix of instruments as 
suggested in Roodman (2006), a practice we follow in all other specifications that jointly 
 
23  We alternatively weighted anti-trafficking policies with distance rather than contiguity. The resulting 
coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. This would suggest that the externality-effect is concentrated 
on geographically proximate countries, as captured by contiguity, with countries further away having no impact.  
24 Note that the sum of the coefficients of the spatial lag and the lagged dependent variable exceed unity in 
column (4) and some other model specifications reported in the following tables. This would imply an explosive 
process if interpreted as a non-changing long-run relationship. However, in the context of the limited time-series 
we focus on, the sum of the coefficients does not need to be below unity since diffusion might resemble an 
explosive process to start with, and then significantly slow down as time passes. Coefficients of similar size are 
commonly reported in the recent literature (e.g., Gassebner et al. 2011). In an analysis of the spread of corporate 
responsibility standards, Perkins and Neumayer (2010) find that an explosive diffusion process in a short panel 
turns into a non-explosive process when a panel of longer duration is analyzed. 18 
 
                                                           
include all spatial lag variables.
25 As can be seen, none of the lags remains significant at 
conventional levels, even though the insignificance is marginal in most cases. However, the 
voting-weighted lag remains significant in a specification where we do not collapse the 
instruments (not shown in the table). Overall, we prefer to rely on the specifications including 
one spatial lag at the time, but note that the significant coefficients might to some extent 
reflect the effects of other, omitted, lags. 
  In Table 5 we focus on the individual dimensions of the 3P index, starting with model 
specifications excluding the spatial lag variables. Estimation is done with GMM, despite the 
ordinal nature of the five-scale variables. This is because the problem of endogeneity is 
arguably more important than ignoring the ordinal nature of the dependent variables, in 
particular when we include the spatial lag variables below.
26 We report specifications both 
including GDP per capita and U.S. aid and excluding them. Note that the Arellano-Bond test 
rejects the regressions focusing on the prosecution index (columns 3 and 4). We therefore 
include the second lag of the dependent variable (in columns 5 and 6). This specification is 
not rejected at conventional levels. 
  According to the results, GDP per capita and U.S. aid are not significant determinants 
of either of the constituent dimensions of anti-trafficking policies at conventional levels. The 
results for the remaining control variables are similar compared to the overall index. The 
lagged dependent variable is significant at the one percent level throughout. Control of 
corruption improves prevention and protection policies, but not those relating to prosecution. 
When controlling for the second lag of the dependent variable in the prosecution regressions, 
the same holds for democracy. Prevention and prosecution policies improve with better 
economic rights of women, at least at the ten percent level, but not with the share of women in 
the legislature, while the reverse holds for protection policies.
27 
  Tables 6 and 7 include the spatial lags to the parsimonious specifications. The results 
for prevention and protection policies are reported in Table 6, those for prosecution policies 
are shown in Table 7 (again including and excluding, respectively, the second lag of the 
dependent variable). Results for prevention policies are similar to those of the 3P aggregate 
policy measure when we include the spatial lags individually (columns 1-5). In addition, there 
is evidence that countries follow policies of those belonging to the same civilizational group, 
arguably because of learning or emulation effects. When we include the spatial lags jointly (in 
 
25 It is necessary to limit the number of instruments because the power of the Sargan-Hansen test is low when 
many instruments are used (Bowsher 2002). Moreover, too many instruments might cause an overfitting of the 
instrumented variable. 
26 This is common in the recent literature (e.g., Dreher et al. 2010). 
27 Note however that the Hansen test is borderline in columns (7) and (8). 19 
 
                                                           
column 6), only the voting-weighted lag remains significant at the ten percent level. Results 
on protection policies are striking in that all evidence for spatial dependence has disappeared, 
with the exception of the voting similarity weighted spatial lag variable (this holds when 
including the spatial lags individually and jointly). Interestingly, the impact of the contiguity-
weighted spatial lag variable is essentially zero. This is exactly what one would expect if our 
argument that contiguity captures an externality effect is correct. Stricter prevention and 
prosecution policies deflect flows of trafficked people onto other countries, thus generating an 
externality, however better victim protection policies do not deflect flows onto others – in fact, 
the opposite may even be the case, as we argued in the introduction.  
  Results on prosecution policies confirm that countries follow the policies of 
contiguous countries. When including the spatial lags separately, countries also seem to 
follow the policies of their major trading partners. Countries do not seem to follow policies of 
politically similar countries, as measured by the voting similarity weighting variable, but 
follow policies of countries belonging to their own civilization. As was the case before, we 
find no evidence for diffusion of policies via pressure from destination countries on their 
major transit and source countries (the relevant spatial lag is marginally significant in column 
(1), but insignificant if the second temporal lag of the dependent variable is included (as is 
required according to the result of the Arellano-Bond test). In the specification that includes 
all spatial lag variables, we even find a negative coefficient of the traffic link weighted spatial 
lag. This points toward a potential substitution effect: Stricter prosecution policies in 
destination countries would allow relevant major transit and origin countries to relax their 
prosecution policies, knowing that perpetrators are more strongly prosecuted elsewhere. 
 
6. Robustness Tests 
Finally, we perform two important robustness tests. First we estimate regional jackknife 
analyses, in which all countries of one particular region are dropped from the analysis at the 
time in order to test whether the results are driven by the presence of observations from a 
specific region in the sample.
28 
  The results shown in Tables 8 and 9 are based on model specifications that include 
each spatial lag variable on its own. Starting with overall anti-trafficking policies in the upper 
part of Table 8, we find that the contiguity and voting-weighted spatial lag variables remain 
 
28 We also examined the robustness of our results to the exclusion of countries where neither major flows of 
human trafficking originate from nor, respectively, go to. In both sets of regressions the t-statistics are lower 
compared to those reported above, but the results are generally similar. All results will be made available in the 
replication data. 20 
 
                                                           
statistically significant independent of the region dropped from the sample. Strikingly, as the 
results reported in column 1 show, there is much more evidence for spatial dependence in 
anti-trafficking policies in developing countries. If the developed countries are dropped from 
the sample, there is additional evidence of anti-trafficking policies diffusing via trade links 
and civilizational similarities. For prevention policies, the contiguity and voting-weighted 
spatial lags remain statistically significant at conventional levels in most jackknife 
specifications, but it is only diffusion via reference to countries that belong to the same 
civilization for which there is almost consistent evidence, with the exception of the model 
excluding countries from North Africa and the Middle East.
29  
  For protection policies, the regional jackknife estimation results reported in the upper 
part of Table 9 suggest that the voting-weighted spatial lag variable is a robust predictor. 
There is again some evidence for diffusion via civilizational belonging, but the respective 
spatial lag variable is only significant in three out of seven estimations. Results for 
prosecution policies largely confirm the existence of spatial dependence working via 
contiguity, trade and civilizational links. Interestingly, in two cases we find again negative 
coefficient signs for the traffic link-weighted spatial lag variable, which we found already in 
table 7, but only for the specification that included all spatial lag variables simultaneously. 
This suggests that the effect reported for table 7 was not entirely due to multi-collinearity 
problems. Dropping either Eastern and Central European or Sub-Saharan African countries 
from the sample, we find that stronger prosecution policies in destination countries have a 
negative (or substitution) effect on prosecution policies in major transit and origin countries, 
such that the latter relax their own policies knowing that perpetrators are more vigorously 
prosecuted in destination countries. This result is not robust to other model specifications and 
we do not want to make too much of it, but we regard this as one of the findings that deserves 
closer attention in future research. 
  Next we turn to the robustness of our results to the choice of control variables. As the 
theory and empirics of anti-trafficking policies have only begun to be seriously addressed 
recently, there is still considerable uncertainty about which explanatory variables to include. 
To examine the sensitivity of the results reported above, we therefore employ (variants of) the 
extreme bounds analysis (EBA), as proposed by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992), 
as our second test for robustness. EBA enables us to examine whether the spatial lags are 
 
29 Note that the specification excluding the Middle East and North Africa suffers from a potential endogeneity 
problem, the p-value of the Hansen test being 0.09, while the Hansen tests in all other samples do not reject the 
specifications at conventional levels of significance. indeed robust determinants of anti-trafficking policies, independent of which additional 
variables are also included in the set of control variables.  
  To conduct an EBA, equations of the following general form are estimated: 
 
    ,                    ,        (2) 
 
where   ,  again represents our measures of anti-trafficking policies in country i at year t, M is 
a vector of “commonly accepted” explanatory variables and F is a vector containing the 
variables of interest (i.e., each spatial lag on its own). The vector Z contains up to three 
possible additional explanatory variables (as in Levine and Renelt 1992), which, according to 
the broader literature, are related to the dependent variable. The error term is v.  
  The EBA-test for a variable in F states that if the lower extreme bound for βF — i.e., 
the lowest value for βF minus two standard deviations — is negative, while the upper extreme 
bound for βF — i.e., the highest value for βF plus two standard deviations — is positive, the 
variable F is not robustly related to anti-trafficking policies. 
  Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that this criterion is far too restrictive for any variable to 
pass the test. If the distribution of the parameter of interest has both positive and negative 
support, then a researcher is bound to find at least one regression model for which the 
estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are run. Consequently, not only do 
we report the extreme bounds, but also the percentage of the regressions in which the 
coefficient of the variable F is statistically different from zero at the five percent level. 
  Moreover, instead of merely analyzing the extreme bounds of the estimates for the 
coefficient of a particular variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) recommended procedure 
and analyze the entire distribution. Accordingly, we also report the unweighted parameter 
estimate of βF and its standard error, as well as the unweighted cumulative distribution 
function, CDF(0). The latter represents the proportion of the cumulative distribution function 
lying on each side of zero. CDF(0) indicates the larger of the areas under the density function 
(either above or below zero). Therefore, CDF(0) always lies between 0.5 and 1.0. 
 The  vector  M contains the same variables as the regressions in the tables above. In 
accordance with the previous literature, to test for the robustness of our results we have 
collected a total of 14 additional variables which could potentially influence the level of anti-
trafficking policies. All variables and their sources are listed in Appendix B.  
  Our choice of variables follows the three most recent papers on the determinants of 





Bartilow (2010) and Simmons and Lloyd (2010) argue, a generally well-developed legal 
system and the enforcement of the law can be an important determinant of the adoption and 
implementation of anti-trafficking laws. We therefore use the rule of law indicators provided 
by the ICRG, as well as the World Bank Governance Indicators, to test for the robustness of 
our results. 
  According to Bartilow, women’s social rights can further capture the gender 
dimension of human trafficking, while Simmons and Lloyd point out that worker’s rights are 
a good indicator of a country’s tolerance of exploitative, forced labor.
30 As the issue of human 
trafficking can be brought into the public spotlight through the media, the level of media 
freedom, measured by Freedom House, has the potential to influence relevant policy 
operations (Simmons and Lloyd). Membership in a prestigious club can also explain the 
compliant behavior of certain countries, in terms of their concern for their reputation. We 
therefore include a dummy for EU membership, following Avdeyeva (2010). The degree of 
economic, social and political globalization, measured by the KOF Index of Globalization 
(Dreher et al. 2008), may also capture associations between the spread of anti-trafficking 
policies and countries’ economic, social and political exposure to the world. This is broadly 
suggested by Avdeyeva (2010) and Simmons and Lloyd (2010). Inflows of remittances (as a 
percentage of GDP) can indicate the economic interests a country may have in sending its 
nationals abroad to work (Simmons and Lloyd). Furthermore, we add those variables already 
included in Table 3, but excluded from later tables due to their insignificance: (log) per capita 
GDP, the amount of U.S aid inflows (as a percentage of GDP) and protocol ratification.  
  The results for the EBA models are presented in Table 10. Following Sala-i-Martin, 
we use a CDF(0) value of 0.90 as the threshold above which we consider variables to be 
robust.
31 We report the results in four panels, one for each dependent variable. The upper-left 
panel of Table 8 shows the results for the overall anti-trafficking index. As can be seen, the 
lagged dependent variable is clearly a robust determinant of current levels, with the CDF(0) 
being equal to one. Among the control variables, democracy and women’s economic rights 
exceed the critical threshold. In line with Table 4 above, the contiguity-weighted spatial lag 
 
30 Both dimensions are measured with data taken from Cingranelli and Richards (2008). 
31 Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes using the (integrated) likelihood to construct a weighted CDF(0). However, the 
varying number of observations in the regressions due to missing observations in some of the variables poses a 
problem. Sturm and de Haan (2001) show that as a result this goodness of fit measure may not be a good 
indicator of the probability that a model is the true model and the weights constructed in this way are not 
equivariant for linear transformations in the dependent variable. Hence, changing scales will result in rather 
different outcomes and conclusions. We therefore restrict our attention to the unweighted version. Furthermore, 
for technical reasons – in particular our unbalanced panel setup – we are unable to use the extension of this 
approach called Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) as introduced by Sala-i-Martin, 
Doppelhofer and Miller (2004). 23 
 
turns out to be a robust determinant of anti-trafficking policies, with a CDF(0) of 0.95. The 
effect of the second spatial lag that was significant in Table 4 – voting-weighted – does not 
turn out to be a robust determinant of the index when we include the various combinations of 
the explanatory variables. However, given that the correct model specification is unknown, it 
is worth noting that the CDF will potentially reflect a combination of correctly specified 
models and misspecified ones. Moreover, the CDF will also partly reflect models with a lower 
number of observations due to missing data for some of the explanatory variables. While we 
can have confidence in the robustness of a variable with a CDF(0) exceeding 0.9, we cannot 
know for sure whether those below this threshold are truly insignificant predictors of the 
dependent variable.  
  The remaining panels of Table 10 test the robustness of the models for the individual 
dimensions of the anti-trafficking index. In summary, some of our previous results turn out to 
be robust. Regarding prevention, the civilization-weighted spatial lag is highly robust, while 
the contiguity and voting-weighted spatial lags are not. With respect to protection, the voting-
weighted lag is robust, while for prosecution policies, the contiguity-weighted lag survives the 
EBA test and the trade-weighted lag is very close to the threshold of a CDF(0) exceeding 0.9. 
Thus conclusively, we continue to find evidence for spatial dependence in anti-trafficking 
policies even if the spatial lag variables are subjected to this rather demanding robustness test. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have introduced new measures of countries’ policies aimed at combating 
international trafficking in human beings. Our aggregate policy index is fine-grained and 
based on the consistent coding of a wide range of informational sources, while our 
disaggregated measures capture the three different fundamental dimensions of anti-trafficking 
policies, namely prevention, protection and prosecution. Scholars may wish to use the 
aggregate index if they are interested in overall policies, but we strongly recommend that 
future research analyzes the different dimensions of overall policies separately and in greater 
detail than we could do here. For example, protection policies mainly protect victims, while 
prosecution policies mainly target the perpetrators. Why countries choose to pursue one type 
of policy rather than the other deserves closer scrutiny.  
  Besides introducing novel data to the still recent, yet burgeoning literature on human 
trafficking, we have also contributed to the analysis of anti-trafficking policies by analyzing 
the effect of spatial dependence in this policy domain, which the extant literature has so far 
neglected. Domestic policies, we have argued, will be affected by policies abroad because of 24 
 
pressure, externalities, learning or emulation effects. Our results only partly corroborate these 
hypotheses. On the one hand, we find no evidence for anti-trafficking policies diffusing via 
pressure exerted by destination countries onto their major transit or origin countries. Our 
results suggest that anti-trafficking policies are an area where destination countries seem 
unwilling, or, even if they are willing, are unable to pressure the countries where the majority 
of victims of human trafficking come from or are channeled through, to change their policies. 
On the other hand, we find consistent evidence for externality effects – with the exception of 
protection policies, for which one would not expect such an effect. We thus find that stricter 
policies in contiguous countries, or sometimes in major trading partners, are followed by 
stricter domestic policies as well. The most likely explanation is simple: Stricter policies 
create negative externalities on neighboring countries and trading partners, exacerbating their 
problems in dealing with human trafficking as a result. Contiguity and trade might also 
partially capture learning or emulation channels of diffusion. In fact, we find robust evidence 
that countries look towards those with similar political views, as proxied by our connectivity 
variable of voting similarity on key issues in the UN General Assembly. This is also the case 
for countries sharing similar cultural values, as proxied by our connectivity variable 
measuring civilizational belonging. All in all, we find robust evidence that countries do not 
operate in isolation when deciding on anti-trafficking policies, being affected by the prior 
choices of other countries on which their policy choices spatially depend. 25 
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Table 1: Global and Regional Average Scores of 3Ps (2000, 2005 and 2009) 
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Notes: Number of countries in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation across prosecution, protection, prevention and the tier-ranking 
 Prosecution  Protection  Prevention Aggregate  3P  Tier-ranking 
Prosecution  1.00      
Protection  0.51  1.00     
Prevention  0.52 0.64 1.00    
Aggregate  3P  0.83 0.85 0.84 1.00  
Tier-ranking  0.53 0.63 0.66 0.72 1.00 
Note: A lower tier-ranking score reflects better compliance on the original scale, so we 
reverse the scale here. Table 3: Anti‐Trafficking Policies (Aggregate 3Ps and Tier‐ranking), 2002‐2009 
 
                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)             (7)   
dependent variable, t‐1        2.060***        0.610***        0.759***        0.302***        0.511***        0.302***        0.525***
                          (12.52)         (23.70)         (33.88)          (8.74)          (7.17)          (8.96)          (7.48)   
control of corruption        0.458***        0.106           0.095           0.961**         0.331**         0.833*          0.385***
                           (4.53)          (1.58)          (1.20)          (2.14)          (2.20)          (1.89)          (4.06)   
democracy        0.025**         0.024***        0.033***       ‐0.067*          0.058***       ‐0.076**         0.069***
                           (2.13)          (3.25)          (3.46)          (1.89)          (3.05)          (2.01)          (3.34)   
women legislators (percent)        0.010*          0.008**         0.008*         ‐0.011           0.014          ‐0.005           0.007   
                           (1.74)          (2.17)          (1.79)          (0.80)          (1.64)          (0.34)          (0.79)   
women economic rights        0.196*          0.126**         0.151**         0.156*          0.288***        0.150*          0.239** 
                           (1.93)          (2.27)          (2.23)          (1.80)          (3.30)          (1.77)          (2.49)   
international regime membership        0.138           0.070           0.105           0.133           0.108                                   
                           (1.08)          (0.98)          (1.17)          (0.75)          (0.66)                                   
(log) GDP p.c.       ‐0.064           0.029           0.018           0.087           0.037                                   
                           (1.12)          (0.73)          (0.36)          (0.28)          (0.39)                                   
US aid (percent of GDP)        0.004           0.012           0.011          ‐0.008          ‐0.002                                   
                           (0.23)          (1.31)          (0.93)          (0.50)          (0.11)                                   
                                                                                                                             
Method oprobit oprobit OLS OLS, fe GMM OLS, fe GMM
Number of observations          918             943             943             943             943             983             983   
Number of countries           143             145             145             145    145          150    150
Adj. R‐Squared               0.54            0.31                                                                                   
Number of instruments                                                                           60                              57   
Arellano‐Bond test (Pr>z)                                                                         0.40                            0.27   






                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)   
dependent variable, t‐1        0.538***        0.487***        0.606***        0.609***        0.563***        0.471***
                           (7.62)          (7.01)          (8.63)          (9.32)          (7.44)          (5.71)   
control of corruption        0.432***        0.397***        0.222**         0.237***        0.349***        0.537***
                           (3.78)          (3.67)          (2.09)          (2.89)          (3.41)          (3.05)   
democracy        0.069***        0.053***        0.060***        0.046***        0.068***        0.061** 
                           (3.19)          (2.60)          (2.81)          (2.60)          (3.21)          (2.04)   
women legislators (percent)       ‐0.005           0.001           0.005           0.007           0.002          ‐0.009   
                           (0.63)          (0.09)          (0.65)          (0.91)          (0.22)          (0.69)   
women economic rights        0.168           0.184*          0.250***        0.194**         0.218**         0.233*  
                           (1.58)          (1.78)          (2.59)          (2.03)          (2.32)          (1.79)   
spatial lag, traffic link‐weighted        0.051                                                                          ‐0.253   
                           (0.64)                                                                          (1.58)   
spatial lag, contiguity‐weighted                        0.232***                                                        0.287   
                                           (2.70)                                                          (1.56)   
spatial lag, trade‐weighted                                        0.197                                          ‐0.007   
                                                           (1.43)                                          (0.02)   
spatial lag, voting‐weighted                                                        0.526**                         0.533   
                                                                           (2.26)                          (1.48)   
spatial lag, civilization‐weighted                                                                        0.088          ‐0.210   
                                                                      (1.22)          (1.42)   
                                                                                             
Method GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Number of observations          807             974             983             983             983             801   
Number of countries           119             148             150             150             150             118   
Number of instruments          101             101             101             101             101              67   
Arellano‐Bond test (Pr>z)         0.27            0.42            0.19            0.20            0.25            0.40   






                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)             (7)             (8)   
dependent variable, t‐1        0.309***        0.301***        0.655***        0.644***        0.709***        0.708***        0.393***        0.389***
                           (4.92)          (4.52)         (10.96)         (10.49)         (16.49)         (18.68)          (5.74)          (5.51)   
dependent variable, t‐2                                                                        0.182***        0.194***                                
                                                                      (3.86)          (4.52)                                   
control of corruption        0.271***        0.213***       ‐0.024           0.059          ‐0.030           0.002           0.205**         0.215***
                           (3.13)          (3.87)          (0.36)          (1.63)          (0.69)          (0.05)          (2.55)          (4.45)   
democracy        0.022***        0.029***        0.018**         0.021**         0.004           0.005           0.031***        0.038***
                           (2.71)          (2.75)          (2.00)          (2.24)          (0.72)          (0.97)          (3.82)          (4.58)   
women legislators (percent)        0.004           0.004           0.002          ‐0.001          ‐0.001          ‐0.002           0.010**         0.009** 
                           (1.07)          (0.70)          (0.49)          (0.21)          (0.45)          (0.90)          (2.20)          (2.23)   
women economic rights        0.099**         0.102**         0.111**         0.109**         0.057*          0.055*         ‐0.014          ‐0.028   
                           (2.35)          (2.16)          (2.47)          (2.37)          (1.67)          (1.67)          (0.31)          (0.57)   
international regime membership        0.055                          ‐0.004                           0.043                           0.037                   
                           (0.73)                          (0.05)                          (0.70)                          (0.50)                   
(log) GDP p.c.       ‐0.047                           0.046                           0.016                           0.013                   
                           (1.03)                          (1.00)                          (0.49)                          (0.28)                   
US aid (percent of GDP)       ‐0.006                          ‐0.004                           0.002                          ‐0.002                   
                           (1.15)                          (0.43)                          (0.64)                          (0.16)                   
                                                                                                             
Method GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Number of observations          946             986             946             987             874             910             945             986   
Number of countries           145             150             145             150             143             147             145             150   
Number of instruments           60              57              60              57              64              61              60              57   
Arellano‐Bond test (Pr>z)         0.26            0.28            0.05            0.02            0.99            0.65            0.59            0.51   








                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)             (7)             (8)             (9)             (10)             (11)             (12)   
dependent variable, t‐1             0.330***        0.335***        0.353***        0.343***        0.384***        0.352***        0.435***        0.431***        0.402***        0.475***        0.462***        0.386***
                           (4.99)          (6.22)          (5.86)          (6.26)          (6.06)          (5.20)          (7.00)          (6.80)          (6.44)          (8.61)          (7.15)          (4.87)   
control of corruption        0.233***        0.213***        0.213***        0.161***        0.186***        0.236***        0.217***        0.177***        0.199***        0.107**         0.155***        0.202***
                           (2.88)          (4.08)          (4.09)          (3.28)          (3.76)          (2.70)          (3.41)          (4.23)          (4.39)          (2.40)          (4.06)          (2.65)   
democracy        0.025**         0.022**         0.028***        0.021**         0.019**         0.018           0.035***        0.033***        0.035***        0.023***        0.033***        0.023** 
                           (2.42)          (2.46)          (2.99)          (2.41)          (2.38)          (1.41)          (3.74)          (4.54)          (4.66)          (3.06)          (4.46)          (2.08)   
women legislators (percent)       ‐0.002          ‐0.002           0.002           0.002           0.003          ‐0.003           0.003           0.009*          0.008*          0.008*          0.006           0.008   
                           (0.56)          (0.38)          (0.39)          (0.36)          (0.51)          (0.57)          (0.83)          (1.88)          (1.69)          (1.86)          (1.42)          (1.47)   
women economic rights        0.081           0.095**         0.089**         0.099**         0.074           0.097*          0.020           0.032          ‐0.012           0.002          ‐0.009           0.055   
                           (1.54)          (2.23)          (2.04)          (2.12)          (1.48)          (1.79)          (0.36)          (0.68)          (0.24)          (0.04)          (0.18)          (0.82)   
spatial lag, traffic link‐weighted       ‐0.101                                                                          ‐0.200          ‐0.052                                                                          ‐0.166   
                           (1.03)                                                                          (1.32)          (0.48)                                                                          (1.08)   
spatial lag, contiguity‐weighted                        0.168*                                                          0.133                           0.016                                                          ‐0.030   
                                           (1.91)                                                          (1.08)                          (0.16)                                                          (0.22)   
spatial lag, trade‐weighted                                       ‐0.030                                          ‐0.333                                           0.079                                           0.211   
                                                           (0.17)                                          (1.11)                                          (0.61)                                          (0.93)   
spatial lag, voting‐weighted                                                        0.843**                         1.317*                                                          0.957***                        1.214** 
                                                                           (2.01)                          (1.91)                                                          (2.83)                          (2.29)   
spatial lag, civilization‐weighted                                                                        0.243**        ‐0.062                                                                           0.196          ‐0.255   
                                                                      (2.06)          (0.28)                                                                          (1.47)          (1.07)   
                                                                                                                             
Method GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Number of observations          810             977             986             986             986             804             810             977             986             986             986             804   
Number of countries           119             148             150             150             150             118             119             148             150             150             150             118   
Number of instruments          101             101             101             101             101              67             101             101             101             101             101              67   
Arellano‐Bond test (Pr>z)         0.39            0.32            0.39            0.39            0.41            0.39            0.45            0.45            0.47            0.32            0.43            0.45   







                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)             (7)             (8)             (9)             (10)             (11)             (12)   
dependent variable, t‐1        0.640***        0.649***        0.671***        0.688***        0.650***        0.525***        0.666***        0.650***        0.676***        0.674***        0.623***        0.613***
                          (10.88)         (10.15)         (12.63)         (11.38)         (11.06)          (7.69)         (15.09)         (13.79)         (15.49)         (17.15)         (13.18)          (9.23)   
dependent variable, t‐2                                                                                                        0.238***        0.151***        0.165***        0.200***        0.190***        0.144***
                                                                                                      (4.71)          (2.86)          (2.90)          (3.92)          (3.60)          (2.72)   
control of corruption        0.065           0.062           0.004           0.031           0.056           0.092*          0.022          ‐0.003          ‐0.010          ‐0.017           0.013           0.084   
                           (1.33)          (1.58)          (0.12)          (0.90)          (1.55)          (1.70)          (0.50)          (0.09)          (0.29)          (0.44)          (0.46)          (1.14)   
democracy        0.008           0.000           0.012           0.014           0.015*          0.013           0.007          ‐0.003           0.004          ‐0.002           0.004           0.003   
                           (0.86)          (0.03)          (1.48)          (1.56)          (1.81)          (1.13)          (1.46)          (0.51)          (0.68)          (0.29)          (0.73)          (0.31)   
women legislators (percent)       ‐0.002          ‐0.001           0.002          ‐0.002           0.001          ‐0.007*         ‐0.004*         ‐0.004          ‐0.002          ‐0.002          ‐0.002          ‐0.010** 
                           (0.50)          (0.25)          (0.60)          (0.52)          (0.33)          (1.65)          (1.72)          (1.49)          (1.01)          (1.09)          (0.83)          (2.40)   
women economic rights        0.074           0.056           0.051           0.080*          0.035           0.097*          0.095*          0.020           0.051           0.062           0.053           0.114** 
                           (1.49)          (1.16)          (1.21)          (1.65)          (0.71)          (1.86)          (1.91)          (0.44)          (1.25)          (1.46)          (1.29)          (2.17)   
spatial lag, traffic link‐weighted        0.220**                                                                        ‐0.214          ‐0.181                                                                          ‐0.575***
                           (2.17)                                                                          (1.20)          (0.99)                                                                          (2.92)   
spatial lag, contiguity‐weighted                        0.300***                                                        0.264**                         0.296***                                                        0.456***
                                           (3.43)                                                          (2.41)                          (4.13)                                                          (3.05)   
spatial lag, trade‐weighted                                        0.571***                                       ‐0.157                                           0.376**                                        ‐0.291   
                                                           (4.17)                                          (0.63)                                          (2.24)                                          (1.24)   
spatial lag, voting‐weighted                                                        0.449                           0.202                                                           0.461                           0.152   
                                                                           (1.53)                          (0.43)                                                          (1.05)                          (0.27)   
spatial lag, civilization‐weighted                                                                        0.202***        0.110                                                                           0.173**         0.008   
                                                                      (3.00)          (1.04)                                                                          (2.37)          (0.06)   
                                                                                                                                                                             
Method GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Number of observations          811             978             987             987             987             805             757             903             910             910             910             752   
Number of countries           119             148             150             150             150             118             117             145             147             147             147             116   
Number of instruments          101             101             101             101             101              67              31              31              31              31              31              67   
Arellano‐Bond test (Pr>z)         0.04            0.04            0.02            0.02            0.03            0.05            0.62            0.61            0.40            0.71            0.76            0.86   



















traffic link‐weighted        0.034           0.053           0.020           0.122           0.135           0.049          ‐0.322*  
                           (0.38)          (0.64)          (0.23)          (1.56)          (1.53)          (0.65)    (1.85)
contiguity‐weighted        0.243***        0.280***        0.143*          0.260***        0.204**         0.216**         0.172** 
                           (2.69)          (2.95)          (1.71)          (3.04)          (2.29)          (2.43)    (1.97)
trade‐weighted        0.239**         0.150           0.142           0.310*          0.252           0.181    0.015
                           (2.07)          (1.13)          (1.17)          (1.88)          (1.46)          (1.29)    (0.12)
voting‐weighted        0.531**         0.568**         0.608**         0.484**         0.426*          0.525**         0.403*  
                           (2.00)          (2.46)          (2.28)          (2.17)          (1.76)          (2.29)    (1.69)
civilization‐weighted        0.204***        0.103           0.017           0.069           0.082           0.080    0.074
                           (2.73)          (1.40)          (0.18)          (1.02)          (1.09)          (0.98)    (1.25)
traffic link‐weighted       ‐0.092          ‐0.106          ‐0.112           0.033          ‐0.057          ‐0.156          ‐0.171   
                           (0.81)          (0.95)          (1.22)          (0.34)          (0.51)          (1.55)          (1.02)   
contiguity‐weighted        0.177*          0.184*          0.119           0.188**         0.130           0.177*          0.126   
                           (1.66)          (1.77)          (1.32)          (2.07)          (1.40)          (1.83)          (1.54)   
trade‐weighted       ‐0.092          ‐0.017          ‐0.160           0.012           0.082          ‐0.082           0.056   
                           (0.56)          (0.10)          (0.99)          (0.07)          (0.39)          (0.44)          (0.31)   
voting‐weighted        0.985*          1.074**         1.092**         0.656           0.650           0.681           0.939***
                           (1.71)          (2.45)          (2.25)          (1.47)          (1.54)          (1.54)          (2.70)   
civilization‐weighted        0.295***        0.223*          0.229*          0.219*          0.135           0.311**         0.233** 



















traffic link‐weighted       ‐0.043          ‐0.085          ‐0.090          ‐0.046           0.022          ‐0.057           0.014   
                           (0.30)          (0.80)          (0.87)          (0.36)          (0.22)          (0.53)          (0.11)   
contiguity‐weighted        0.101          ‐0.008          ‐0.048           0.073           0.046           0.018           0.045   
                           (0.91)          (0.09)          (0.48)          (0.71)          (0.43)          (0.17)          (0.49)   
trade‐weighted        0.041           0.044           0.043           0.012           0.093           0.050          ‐0.018   
                           (0.29)          (0.31)          (0.34)          (0.09)          (0.66)          (0.37)          (0.14)   
voting‐weighted        1.050***        1.052***        1.098***        0.831***        0.811**         0.885**         0.935***
                           (2.71)          (3.00)          (3.11)          (2.65)          (2.38)          (2.51)          (2.72)   
civilization‐weighted        0.243**         0.161           0.309**         0.146           0.111           0.247*          0.067   
                           (2.09)          (1.22)          (1.99)          (1.02)          (0.87)          (1.75)          (0.58)   
traffic link‐weighted       ‐0.005          ‐0.219          ‐0.424**        ‐0.218           0.007          ‐0.137          ‐0.799** 
                           (0.03)          (1.12)          (2.25)          (1.09)          (0.05)          (0.79)          (2.02)   
contiguity‐weighted        0.231***        0.338***        0.226***        0.372***        0.311***        0.288***        0.371***
                           (2.93)          (4.27)          (2.68)          (4.33)          (4.35)          (3.95)          (3.74)   
trade‐weighted        0.324**         0.403**         0.250           0.360**         0.427**         0.386**         0.462** 
                           (1.99)          (2.38)          (1.30)          (2.09)          (2.34)          (2.20)          (2.10)   
voting‐weighted       ‐0.000           0.561           0.351           0.398           0.518           0.478           0.694   
                           (0.00)          (1.17)          (0.65)          (0.91)          (1.13)          (1.07)          (1.51)   
civilization‐weighted        0.115           0.202***        0.099           0.170**         0.196***        0.186**         0.232***














Variable Avg. Beta Avg.Std.Err %Sign. CDF‐UV a r i a b l e A v g .  Beta Avg.Std.Err %Sign. CDF‐U
dependent variable, t‐1 0.51 0.09 1.00 1.00 dependent variable, t‐1 0.32 0.09 0.99 0.99
control of corruption 0.15 0.23 0.29 0.74 Corruption 0.23 0.12 0.71 0.90
democracy 0.05 0.02 0.71 0.95 Democracy 0.02 0.01 0.73 0.93
women legislators (percent) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.52 Women in parliament 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.70
women economic rights 0.29 0.13 0.91 0.98 Women economic rights 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.72
traffic link‐weighted 0.02 0.12 0.09 0.60 traffic link‐weighted ‐0.12 0.15 0.09 0.77
contiguity‐weighted 0.21 0.11 0.78 0.95 contiguity‐weighted ‐0.06 0.16 0.00 0.63
trade‐weighted 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.81 trade‐weighted ‐0.05 0.21 0.01 0.56
voting‐weighted 0.37 0.32 0.41 0.84 voting‐weighted 0.83 0.44 0.64 0.95
civilization‐weighted 0.15 0.12 0.26 0.83 civilization‐weighted 0.23 0.22 0.32 0.80
dependent variable, t‐1 0.32 0.07 1.00 1.00 dependent variable, t‐1 0.69 0.06 1.00 1.00
Corruption 0.16 0.12 0.48 0.89 Dependent variable, t‐2 0.19 0.07 0.91 0.99
Democracy 0.02 0.01 0.54 0.94 Corruption ‐0.11 0.10 0.33 0.79
Women in parliament 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.65 Democracy 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.71
Women economic rights 0.13 0.06 0.84 0.97 Women in parliament 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.86
Women economic rights 0.10 0.07 0.45 0.92
traffic link‐weighted ‐0.10 0.13 0.12 0.72
contiguity‐weighted 0.13 0.12 0.24 0.82 traffic link‐weighted ‐0.14 0.24 0.11 0.68
trade‐weighted 0.03 0.21 0.02 0.53 contiguity‐weighted 0.26 0.10 0.99 0.99
voting‐weighted 0.59 0.51 0.43 0.84 trade‐weighted 0.32 0.28 0.51 0.89
civilization‐weighted 0.40 0.17 0.83 0.98 voting‐weighted 0.72 0.53 0.18 0.86






Appendix A: Anti-trafficking Policy Index Coding Guideline 
 




In measuring government prosecution policy, our primary interests are: 1) whether the 
country has legislative and other measures to establish criminal offences for trafficking in 
persons, in line with the definition provided by the Anti-trafficking Protocol; and 2) whether 
such legislative and other measures are appropriately and effectively enforced.  
Score 5: 
The country has a legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons and; the 
law is fully enforced in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and punishment 
of such offenders. Generally, the country should maintain a stringent level of penalty (either 
more than five years imprisonment or punishment equivalent to other related crimes such as 
rape or labor exploitation).  
Score 4:  
The country has a legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons; BUT the 
law is not fully enforced in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and 
punishment of such offenders.  
Score 3:  
The country does NOT have a legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in 
persons; but applies some other relevant laws (such as laws against rape, slavery, exploitation, 
abuse or human rights violation) to punish offenders of such crimes; and the law is fully or 
adequately enforced in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and punishment 
of such offenders. 
Score 2:  
The country does NOT have a legislative measure specifically prohibiting trafficking in 
persons; BUT applies some other related law to punish offenders of such crimes; the law is 
not adequately enforced in the form of investigations, prosecutions, convictions and 
punishment of such offenders. If the country has a legislative measure specifically prohibiting 
trafficking in persons but does not enforce the law at all (or there is no evidence that the 





The country does NOT have a legislative measure prohibiting trafficking in persons and no 




In measuring government protection policy, our primary interests are: whether the country 
protects the human rights of victims of trafficking; identifies them; and provides for the 
physical, psychological and social recovery of victims of trafficking by legislative and other 
measures.  
Score 5: 
The country does not punish victims of trafficking for acts related to the situations being 
trafficked; does not impose the self-identification of victims; and exerts STRONG efforts to 
give victims information on, and assistance for, relevant court and administrative proceedings, 
as well as support for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims such as 
housing (shelter), medical assistance, job training, (temporal) residence permit, and other 
assistance for rehabilitation and repatriation.  
Score 4: 
The country does not punish victims of trafficking for acts related to the situations being 
trafficked; does not impose the self-identification of victims; and exerts MODERATE efforts 
to give victims information on, and assistance for, relevant court and administrative 
proceedings, as well as support for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims 
such as housing (shelter), medical assistance, job training, (temporal) residence permit, and 
other assistance for rehabilitation and repatriation.  
Score 3: 
The country does not punish victims of trafficking for acts related to the situations being 
trafficked; does not impose the self-identification of victims; and exerts LIMITED efforts to 
give victims information on, and assistance for, relevant court and administrative proceedings, 
as well as support for the physical, psychological and social recovery of victims such as 
housing (shelter), medical assistance, job training, (temporal) residence permit, and other 
assistance for rehabilitation and repatriation. Or, if the country fails to ensure that victims of 
trafficking are never punished for acts related to the trafficking itself or the consequences of 
being trafficking BUT exerts STRONG/Moderate efforts in protecting victims, the country 
qualifies for score 3.  43 
 
Score 2: 
The country fails to ensure that victims of trafficking are punished for acts related to the 
trafficking itself or to the consequences of being trafficked; and there is limited assistance and 
support for court proceedings and the recovery of victims. Or, the country does not punish 
victims of trafficking in persons for acts related to the situations being trafficked; however, 
does not provide any assistance or support for recovery, rehabilitation and repatriation.  
Score 1: 
The country punishes victims of trafficking in persons for acts related to the situations being 




In measuring government protection policy, our primary interests are; whether the country 
establishes and practices comprehensive policies, programs and other measures to prevent and 
combat trafficking in persons.
32  
Score 5: 
The country demonstrates VERY STRONG efforts preventing trafficking in persons, such as 
implementing public and media campaigns for anti-trafficking awareness; training 
government and military officials (including peace keepers); facilitating information exchange 
among relevant authorities; monitoring borders, train stations, airports, etc.; adopting national 
action plans for combating trafficking in persons; promoting cooperation with NGOs and 
international organizations in the country; and facilitating bilateral and/or multilateral 
cooperation with other governments.  
Score 4: 
The country demonstrates STRONG efforts against trafficking in persons, such as 
implementing public and media campaigns for anti-trafficking awareness; training 
government and military officials (including peace keepers); facilitating information exchange 
among relevant authorities; monitoring borders, train stations, airports, etc.; adopting national 
action plans for combating trafficking in persons; promoting cooperation with NGOs and 
international organizations in the country; and facilitating bilateral and/or multilateral 
cooperation with other governments.  
 
                                                            
32 In evaluating the preventive efforts of governments, we do not include broader developmental measures, such 
as promotion of education and poverty reduction, in order to distinguish governmental efforts specifically 
addressed at fighting human trafficking.  44 
 
Score 3: 
The country demonstrates MODEST efforts against trafficking in persons, such as 
implementing public and media campaigns for anti-trafficking awareness; training 
government and military officials (including peace keepers); facilitating information exchange 
among relevant authorities; monitoring borders, train stations, airports, etc.; adopting national 
action plans for combating trafficking in persons; promoting cooperation with NGOs and 
international organizations in the country; and facilitating bilateral and/or multilateral 
cooperation with other governments.  
Score 2: 
The country demonstrates LIMITED efforts against trafficking in persons, such as 
implementing public and media campaigns for anti-trafficking awareness; training 
government and military officials (including peace keepers); facilitating information exchange 
among relevant authorities; monitoring borders, train stations, airports, etc.; adopting national 
action plans for combating trafficking in persons; promoting cooperation with NGOs and 
international organizations in the country; and facilitating bilateral and/or multilateral 
cooperation with other governments.  
Score 1: 
The country demonstrates NO efforts against trafficking in persons. 45 
 
Appendix B. Data Description and Sources 
Variable Description  Source 
 
Prosecution Prosecution  policy  measure. Scale 5 (full 
compliance) to 1 (no compliance). 
own calculations 
Protection  Protection policy measure. Scale 5 (full 
compliance) to 1 (no compliance). 
own calculations 
Prevention Prevention  policy  measure. Scale 5 (full 
compliance) to 1 (no compliance). 
own calculations 
Aggregate 3Ps  Sum of prevention, protection and 
prosecution scores. Scale 15 to 3. 
own calculations 
Tier-ranking Compliance  with  US anti-trafficking law. 
Scale 1 (full compliance) to 3 (no 
compliance). 
United States Department of State 
(2001-2010) 
Control of Corruption  Around -1.63 to 2.58, with higher values 
corresponding to better outcomes 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) 
Democracy   Measure of democracy. +10 (full 
democracy) to -10 (full autocracy). 
Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2009) 
Women Legislators  Share of female legislators in parliament.  World Bank Gender Statistics 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
Women’s Economic 
and Social Rights 
Score 3 (nearly fully guaranteed) to score 0 
(no rights). 
Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights 
Dataset (2008) 
Workers’ Rights  Score 2 (fully granted) to 0 (severely 
restricted). 




Code 1 if the country is a member of the 
Anti-trafficking Protocol in a given year. 
Otherwise, 0.  
http://www.unodc.org/ 
 
US aid   Share of bilateral aid from the US (% of 
GDP). 
OECD Aid Statistics 
(log) GDP pc  Per capita income in 2000 constant prices.   ERS International Macroeconomic Data 
Set 
UNGA Voting   Bilateral similarities in voting behaviors on 
key votes in the UN General Assembly. 
Voeten and Merdzanovic (2008), Kilby 
(2009) 
Bilateral Trade Flows  Amounts of bilateral trade flows between 
two countries. 
UN Commodity trade statistics database 
(COMTRADE, 2010) 
Contiguity dummy  Code 1 if two countries share a land border 
or are separated by less than 150 miles of 





Code 1 if two countries share a common 
civilization (Western, Islamic, Africa, Latin 
American, Sinic or Hindu); otherwise 0. 
Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000) 
Traffic-linkage  Severity of bilateral human trafficking flows 
in destination country from origin or transit 
countries: From 9 (high flows) to 0 (no 
flows). 
UNODC (2006) 
Rule of Law  Around -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better outcomes. 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) 
Law and Order  Assessment on legal system and observance 
of low. Score 2 to 6, with higher values 
corresponding to better outcomes.  




Economic, social and political globalization. 
Score 1-100, with a higher value 
corresponding to higher globalization. 
Dreher et al. (2008)  
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
 
Media Freedom  Freedom of the Press Index . Score 0 (best) 
to 100 (worst). 
Freedom house (2009) 
EU membership  Dummy variable. Code 1 if a country is a 
member of the EU in the year, otherwise, 0.  
http://europa.eu/about-eu/member-
countries/index_en.htm/ 
Remittance  Inflows of remittance (% of GDP).  World Development Indicator 
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variables Observations  Mean  Std.  Errors  Minimum  Maximum 
Prosecution  918  3.80 1.17 1.00 5.00 
Protection  918  2.92 1.06 1.00 5.00 
Prevention  918  3.35 0.88 1.00 5.00 
Aggregate  3Ps  918  10.07  3.00 3.00 15.00 
Tier-ranking  918  1.86 1.00 1.00 3.00 
Control  of  Corruption  918  -0.10 1.00  -1.63 2.58 
Democracy  918  4.50 5.93 -10.00  10.00 
Women legislators (%)  918  16.46  10.10  0.00  56.30 
Women’s  economic  rights    918  1.28 0.73 0.00 3.00 
Intl.  regime  membership  918  0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
(log)  GDP  pc  918  7.94 1.65 4.50 11.37 
US aid (% of GDP)  918  0.75  2.32  0.00  44.56 
 